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Abstract
Commentators on the ‘East Asian Miracle’ of inclusive rural growth have often pointed
toward shared growth policies. But why were these policies not chosen elsewhere? This paper
shows that economies with a stronger middle class may sustain higher productivity through
public good provision. We model voters who invest in either subsistence or technologies in
which public goods complement private capital. Investment and technology choices vary with
wealth and the level of public goods enforced by political lobbies. We show that increased
productive possibilities, such as those of an emerging middle class, can further power reforms
when money matters in politics.
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1 Introduction
Twenty years ago scholars and practitioners of economic development paused to consider the
meaning of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ of rapid and inclusive economic growth. Standing in sharp
contrast to the miracle of East Asia were Latin America and Africa, described by some as mired
in a vicious circle of modest and exclusionary growth. While much was learned about the shared
growth policies that helped create inclusive development in East Asia, there was also a revisionist
reminder that policymaking is not cookery, and that recipes that worked in one locale will not be
replicated elsewhere by a set of disinterested chefs. In other words, the revisionist question was not
what was done differently in East Asia, but why did political actors choose differently elsewhere
in the global South.
This paper models the political economy behind the choices made promoting inclusive growth.
Since political choices often reflect vested interests formed by past allocations and commitments,
we study the interaction of exogenous wealth inequality and individual production choices to in-
fluence politicians’ delivery of inclusive growth. At the heart of our analysis is a political econ-
omy model wherein public goods complement the productivity of private investment, especially
for small commercial producers. Government provision of these public goods not only increases
growth (by crowding-in private investment), it reduces inequality by creating inclusive growth, as
it facilitates the transition of low wealth individuals from subsistence to more remunerative com-
mercial production. However, because the benefit of public goods varies by asset level, so does
the willingness to pay for them through taxes. By modeling endogenous production strategies
around which political lobbies form, we show that the emergent equilibrium policy is sensitive to
the initial distribution of wealth.1 Wealth conditions not only the set of voters in favor of public
goods, but the strength of their preferences through campaign contributions. This sets in motion
increasing political returns: public good commitments open up new productive possibilities to
voters, who can use their newfound income to lobby and politically enforce these commitments.
Accordingly, the model can exhibit multiple equilibria. Credible promises of large leaps (perhaps
by committed governments or charismatic leaders) may be necessary to move from low to high
growth outcomes.2
For these reasons, inclusive growth policies, i.e. policies that increase public goods to rational-
ize widespread commercial participation, are more likely under lower inequality scenarios. Politi-
cal equilibria which fail to provide any public goods coincide with societies that fail to maintain a
middle class. Conversely, societies with a stronger incipient middle class capable of transitioning
to commercial production will provide more public goods. Notably, the class division of soci-
1This can lead to multiple equilibria consisting of both low and high levels of public good provision. See Olovsson
and Roine (2008) for a literature overview and an example in the case of public education.
2This formalizes insights by Pierson (2000) regarding the consequences of increasing returns in politics.
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ety varies by the implicit strength of classes under the same productive possibilities, as opposed
to being technologically determined (e.g. Matsuyama, 2006). From this perspective, the exten-
sive land reforms carried out in Japan, Korea and Taiwan designed to create a prosperous class of
commercially oriented farmers may have laid the foundation for future successes.3,4
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to taking seriously the suggestion that inclusive growth
requires that lower wealth agents be of interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs. Thus,
this paper models political economy in the spirit of work such as Roemer (1982) and Eswaran and
Kotwal (1986) and thereby provides a complementary mechanism in ‘stagnation to growth’ stories
of development.5 Previous work has noted the crucial role of non-convexities in accumulation and
the importance of different production modes (e.g. Galor et al. (2009)). Distinct from previous
work where inequality is mediated through labor or credit markets, here we focus on the role of
class-based politics wherein groups rather than individuals attempt to circumvent market imper-
fections.6 The unique insight of our special interest politics approach is that increased productive
possibilities, such as those of an emerging middle class, can further power reforms when money
matters in politics.
Finally, as pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), the analysis of economic policy
needs to include the consequences for political outcomes, as otherwise ‘good economic policy can
make bad politics’. We have discussed why reductions in inequality may have political knock-
on effects through political increasing returns. However, this is not the only (or most pragmatic)
policy space in which we might expect to see political shifts flowing from economic policy (Dixit,
1997). Risk and isolation can trap large numbers of households at low levels of income, making
them of little interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs.7 In this circumstance, the latter
have little to gain from offering policies designed to appeal to the trapped population. Therefore
even economies with relatively modest levels of asset inequality may operate like high inequality
economies, with politicians eschewing investment in shared growth-promoting public goods in
favor of other pathways to political power. This suggests an emphasis on economic policies that
break or relax the poverty trap logic, thereby changing the political calculus in ways that would
make inclusive growth policies more likely and self-sustaining.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the earlier East Asian
3For a detailed analysis of the political consequences of land reform in Japan, see Kitamura (2013).
4It is additionally possible that low inequality prefigured inclusive institutions which interacted with export led
growth to encourage successful institutions akin to (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
5Existing theories depict the role of technology, financial development, accumulation, institutional development
and evolving social preferences (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005), and export led growth (Akerman et al., 2013). However,
the role of democracy in jointly directing the public and private sector is often neglected (Sen et al., 1990).
6See, for instance, the review of Matsuyama (2011).
7Such households are likely those that would additionally face expropriation risk in the absence of broadly acces-
sible property rights as emphasized by other authors, see Chapter 13 of Ferguson (2013).
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miracle debate. Section 3 lays out an economy in which voters endogenously adopt technology,
which determines their material interests in shared growth. Section 4 formalizes a political econ-
omy model that codifies insights that emerged from the debate about the impact of initial asset
inequality and risk on endogenous policy choices. Section 5 considers the impact of isolation and
risk on policy choices and the potential for positive political externalities. Section 6 concludes.
2 Vicious and Virtuous Circles of Economic Growth
The observation that East Asian economies simultaneously experienced rapid growth with low and
diminishing inequality provoked a rethinking of the linkages between growth and inequality.8 This
section first briefly reviews some of the macro-econometric evidence about these linkages. We then
turn to consider the micro-foundations for such linkages, using them as a springboard to launch a
deeper exploration of the political economy of inclusive growth.
2.1 Initial Inequality and Inclusive Growth: Econometric Evidence
In a provocative paper, Birdsall et al. (1995) employed cross-country data and showed that control-
ling for the level of per-capita GDP, aggregate human capital accumulation is enhanced by greater
income equality and its implied higher absolute incomes for the least well off members of a soci-
ety. In their interpretation, the rapid, inequality-reducing growth characteristic of the East Asian
experience was the product of a process in which low initial levels of inequality 1) enhance aggre-
gate accumulation, 2) increase the rate of economic growth and 3) boost capital accumulation in
low wealth households, further decreasing inequality. In other words, low initial inequality creates
a virtuous circle of inclusive growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).
This thesis has received further support from studies of agricultural growth. A time series study
by de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) finds that agrarian growth in Latin America is associated with
sharply increasing rural inequality. While we know of no similar study of East Asia, Ravallion and
Datt (1995) find that in India it is agrarian growth that is most strongly associated with reduced
poverty and inequality. However, they also find that growth in Bihar—the Indian state with sharp,
near Latin American levels of land inequality—appears to contradict this general pattern. Perhaps
the most troubling aspect of the de Janvry and Sadoulet result is that they find that the association
between agrarian growth and increasing rural inequality has been even stronger in recent, post-
8The World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (Page, 1994), as well as debates (Rodrik, 1994; Wade, 2004), and
follow-up work reported in Aoki et al. (1998), played important roles in sparking this rethinking. The aptly named
book, Beyond Tradeoffs: Market Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin America, (Birdsall et al., 1998) emerged from
this discussion and was intended to be a policy primer to enable Latin American governments to emulate the inclusive
growth patterns observed in East Asia.
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liberalization growth spells.9 Subsequent studies have found that rural exposure to liberalization
may slow poverty reduction and consumption growth (Topalova, 2010).
Finally, Carter (2004) shows that the impact of agrarian inequality on aggregate economic
growth should dissipate over time (as the agricultural economy shrinks) unless inequality has
deeper structural effects on the income distribution consequences of growth. The econometric
results confirm agrarian inequality has a surprising legacy effect even as economies industrialize.
2.2 Theoretical Foundations of Inclusive Growth
While this econometric evidence is telling, it does not identify the mechanisms linking initial eco-
nomic equality and inclusive growth. There is in fact no shortage of theoretical papers that establish
foundations for that linkage. To pick one example that speaks directly to the Birdsall et al. (1995)
results, Ljungqvist (1993) explores how the absence of capital and insurance markets leads poor
people to under invest in human capital. Holding per-capita income constant, an increase in in-
equality will push more people below the income threshold where human capital underinvestment
begins.10
Similarly, there is a large literature that shows that imperfect rural financial markets can create
an economic dynamic that squeezes out low wealth producers.11 Similar to Lunqvist’s analysis,
increases in asset inequality that push more individuals beyond the reach of financial markets
implies a deepening pattern of exclusion. From these theoretical perspectives, the sensitivity of
the income distribution consequences of growth to initial inequality rests squarely on financial
market failures. The theories of credit rationing12 that explain these sorts of wealth biased financial
market failures are essentially saying that low wealth agents are of no interest to the economic
entrepreneurs on the supply side of financial markets. Facing these issues, East Asian governments
undertook measures that bolstered the competitiveness of small farm sector.13 These shared growth
policies reshaped markets in ways that enabled the small farm sector to flourish and underwrote an
inclusive growth strategy.14
9While the estimated increase in inequality is not so sharp as to increase rural poverty in the wake of agrarian
growth, it has clearly blunted the potentially positive impact of growth on rural poverty, as they analyze in some detail.
10Krebs (2003) further shows that these effects are large, to the extent that government sponsored insurance is likely
welfare improving, even if financed in a second-best fashion.
11The dynamic stochastic programming analysis of Zimmerman and Carter (2003) shows how these missing markets
can create exclusionary patterns in which initial asset inequality deepens over time. Work on agricultural growth booms
in Latin America, summarized by Carter and Barham (1996), finds empirical evidence of many of these same patterns.
12See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a general treatment of credit rationing, and Carter (1988) and
Boucher et al. (2007) for extensions and applications to rural financial markets.
13A quick review shows that agricultural policy in Japan, Taiwan and Korea shows a common emphasis on small
farm credit, extension and price stabilization. For a brief overview of rural and agricultural policy concerns and
objectives, see Wye Group (2011).
14Indeed, even within highly advanced economies, the exclusion of farmers from agricultural support programs can
4
These observations are consistent with those of Aoki et al. (1998). Like others writing in
this area, these authors note that East Asian governments engaged in a wide range of policies,
which they describe as “market enhancing,” meaning that the state carefully intervened in those
realms where markets work least well (e.g., providing capital and insurance), and by so doing
enabled markets to then effectively coordinate fundamental decisions of resource allocation and
investment.
While others have noted this disciplined intervention of East Asian states, Aoki et al. (1998)
suggest a material explanation for this state behavior. Low levels of initial inequality (and a weak
elite) in East Asia implied that the only viable constituency for a government seeking political
support was a broadly-based one built around shared growth policies. Agricultural policy provides
one of the clearest examples of the endogeneity of a broadly-based or shared growth strategy to
low levels of initial inequality. Land reform in much of East Asia not only deeply redistributed
land ownership rights, but also imposed land ownership ceilings of only a few hectares. Aoki et al.
suggest that the absence of a strong rural elite deprived East Asian governments of a politically in-
fluential target group for the sorts of divisible and privately appropriable goods which governments
so often provision to develop the rural sector.15
Instead, policy focused on discovering and providing the key indivisible, quasi-public goods
that markets were ill-conditioned to offer: goods which are difficult to exclude (roads),16 that
involve large fixed costs (dams, R&D),17 or face coordination problems (irrigation and sanitation
systems)18. In addition, governments targeted institutional innovations to open credit and insurance
options. What other observers of East Asian agricultural policy have attributed to an exogenous
objective of shared growth (Tomich et al., 1995) is, in the argument of Aoki et al., a product of low
initial inequality operating through a political economy circuit. The next section will model this
political economy of shared growth policies.
3 Asset Inequality and the Politics of Shared Growth
This section offers our core economic model designed to shed light on the economic and politi-
cal forces that determine whether governments choose to provide tax-financed public goods that
complement private investment, or whether they choose a low tax rate regime which allows indi-
viduals to enjoy more private goods. The implicit underlying role of public good provision can
cause rapid and drastic exit from commercial production Cowan and Feder (2012).
15E.g. subsidized credit, machinery subsidies, investment credits, etc.
16When geographically separate ethnic concentrations make roads functionally excludable, public investment is
likely misallocated as Burgess et al. (2013) find.
17Dams also present coordination issues due to the redistributional pattern of downstream winners and local losers
(Duflo and Pande, 2007).
18The extent of such coordination problems may be exacerbated by agro-ecological conditions Wade (1988).
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be thought of as a second-best policy which encourages high productivity activities when incom-
plete financial markets otherwise constrain agents, thus generating inclusive growth.19 Under our
model, the complementary value of public goods depends on an individual’s wealth, which implies
heterogeneous preferences for the level of public good expenditure. In particular, public goods are
especially valuable for those enabled to transition from subsistence to commercial production.20
Because the economic valuation of public goods varies across voters, politics will matter for the
choice of policy in potentially interesting ways.
As a preview, the timing of a political-economic cycle is:
1. Voters choose their class, contingent on a rational expectation of political outcomes.
2. Parties propose platforms, maximizing their probability of being elected.
3. Commercial lobbies contribute to campaigns to maximize constituent welfare.
4. Voters elect parties, the winner’s platform is implemented, and voters produce.
Since the model can be solved by backward induction, this section takes the level of public good
provision as exogenous to focus on production by voters. We then examine endogenous class
formation in response to economic incentives and public good provision, and then consider voters’
political preferences. The following section then details the behavior of lobbies and parties to
arrive at political-economic equilibria.
3.1 Investment, Production and Consumption
We consider a society comprised of a unit mass of voters who live two-periods. Politically, each
individual is endowed with one vote. Economically, each individual i enjoys an initial wealth
endowment, Ai, where A(i) denotes the distribution of wealth in period 0. Before considering
how the overall society operates, and how its operation is influenced by inequality, we need to first
characterize economic behavior and political preferences along the wealth continuum.
To generate income, each individual has access to two capital-dependent technologies: a sub-
sistence technology, and a higher yielding commercial technology that depends on both public and
private capital. Wealth Bi invested in the subsistence technology generates returns at a constant
rate r, generating an income flow of rBi.
19Note that the core model here is a two-period poverty trap model. Subsistence Producers are trapped at a low level
of well-being by the combination of their own initial asset level and their inability to borrow.
20In this sense, we provide a microeconomic foundation for the G and K phases of rapid economic development as
laid out by Chapter 1 of Aoki et al. (2012).
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Wealth not allocated to the subsistence technology can be allocated to the commercial technol-
ogy F which generates an income stream given by:
F (Ki,κi) = θ (Kαi /2+κ
α
i /2)
1/α with α,θ ∈ (0,1) ,
where Ki is private capital, while κi is a quasi-public capital good that is complementary to private
capital in production. Use of the commercial technology requires payment of a fixed, start-up cost
of cF . We additionally assume θ > 21/αr, so that once cF is paid, investments Ki always dominate
the subsistence technology.21 As a quasi-public good, κi can be provided both publicly (P) and
privately (Pi) so that individual i has access to:
κi = P+Pi.
However, private provision of the quasi-public good incurs an additional fixed cost, cP, reflecting
the difficulty of private actors to both construct and ‘fence in’ these quasi-public goods.22 The
relationship of these production strategies to fixed costs is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Fixed Costs and Production Strategies
21Note that the marginal investment product of F is (θ/2)Kα−1i (K
α
i /2+κ
α
i /2)
1/α−1 ≥ θ2−1/α > r.
22We interpret public provision of the quasi-public good P as non-rivalrous, but private enhancements Pi as poten-
tially rivalrous, thus incurring costs to ensure private access.
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Figure 2: Production Technologies and Inter-temporal Trade-Offs
(a) Production Regimes (b) Inter-temporal Consumption by Type
The solid lines in Figure 2a illustrate these two different production technologies. The F(Ki,P)
curve is drawn for a given level of the public good P, assuming no private provisioning of this
good (Pi = 0). Increases in P and the level of the public good will complement and increase the
productivity of private capital. Thus, the public provision of P is a shared or inclusive growth policy
as investments in P not only boost the productivity of all individuals who employ the commercial
technology, but also opens a door of upward mobility for some individuals who would otherwise
find themselves using only the subsistence technology.
Given these production possibilities, agents make their production choices in order to maximize
their two-period utility, discounted at rate β = (1+ r)−1:
[
log
(
c0i
)
+β log
(
c1i
)]
/(1+β ) . (1)
The budget constraints faced by each voter across periods are given by
c0i ≤ Ai−Ki−Bi−Pi− cF ·1Ki>0− cP ·1Pi>0, (2)
c1i ≤ F (Ki,P+Pi)+Ki+Pi+(1+ r)Bi,
where 1Ki>0 and 1Pi>0 are the binary indicator variables that take the value of one when when
the agent respectively invests in Ki and Pi and must pay the fixed costs cF and cP.23 Note that
an individual’s initial wealth endowment needs to fund both period 0 consumption and capital
23This setting corresponds to the definition of ‘natural’ inequality deriving from differences in economically valu-
able assets across voters as opposed to inequality rooted in politically captured rents (Cogneau, 2012). Alternatively,
the ability to access commercial technologies or privately invest in Pi could be modeled as being allocated by existing
institutions which would distinguish the role of wealth and political resources in voters’ economic interests.
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allocated to produce income for period 1. Period 1 consumption is then the income flows generated
plus assets retained. Finally, agents cannot borrow, and hence the additional constraints that:
Bi, Ki, Pi ≥ 0. (3)
Letting c˜0i and c˜
1
i denote the values of consumption that maximize (1) subject to (2)-(3), we
denote an agent’s welfare after making investment and consumption decisions as
U (Ai,P)≡max
c0i ,c
1
i
[
log
(
c0i
)
+β log
(
c1i
)]
/(1+β )= log c˜0i
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)1/(2+r)
.
3.2 Economic Classes as Endowment-necessitated Behavior
The model outlined in the prior section leads to three possible livelihood strategies or potential
economic classes defined by the inequality constraints in (3):24
1. Subsistence Producers (Bi > 0, Ki = 0, Pi = 0). These individuals, whom we would expect
to be at the bottom of the asset distribution, will not pay cF nor cP and optimally choose
Bi = Ai/(2+ r) and c˜0i = c˜
1
i = (1+ r)Ai/(2+ r). The first order condition for Bi implies
c1i = c
0
i , so each voter’s inter-temporal allocation of assets must satisfy Bi = Ai/(2+ r).
Consequently, the welfare of a Subsistence Producer, denoted US, is given by
US (Ai,P) = log((1+ r)Ai/(2+ r)) .
2. Petty Commercial Producers (Bi = 0, Ki > 0, Pi = 0) rely on existing public goods. These
agents pay cF to produce, using investments Ki in the high productivity technology F . The
first order condition for Ki implies each voter’s inter-temporal allocation of assets satisfies
c˜0i = Ai−Ki− cF , c˜1i = F (Ki,P)+Ki, c˜1i /(1+∂F/∂Ki) = c˜0i /(1+ r) . (4)
Consequently, Ki is fixed by (4) and the welfare of a Petty Producer, UP, is
UP (Ai,P) = log(Ai−Ki− cF) [(1+∂F/∂Ki)/(1+ r)]1/(2+r) .
3. Large Commercial Producers (Bi = 0, Ki > 0, Pi > 0) who self-provide complementary
production goods Pi for their private use by paying cF and cP. These individuals supplement
existing public goods until the returns from investments and public goods are equated at
24Note that certain possible classes, e.g. Bi,Ki > 0, are ruled out by technology assumptions.
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Pi = Ki−P. The first order conditions for Ki and Pi imply each individual’s inter-temporal
allocation of assets must satisfy
c˜0i = Ai−2Ki+P− cF − cP, c˜1i = (θ +2)Ki−P, c˜1i /(1+θ/2) = c˜0i /(1+ r) .
This implies investments are fixed by
Ki = [(Ai− cF − cP)(1+θ/2)+(2+ r+θ/2)P]/(2+ r)(2+θ) .
Under this allocation, returns to additional assets become linear as shown in Figure 3a. The
welfare of a Large Commercial Producer, UL, is
UL (Ai,P) = log
(
(1+ r)(1+θ/2)(Ai− cF − cP)+ r (θ/2)P
(2+ r)(1+θ/2)
)(
1+θ/2
1+ r
)−(1+r)/(2+r)
.
Looking across these three potential economic classes, we see that returns to wealth invested in
production increase as we move from the Subsistence to the Petty Commercial to the Large Com-
mercial strategies. The marginal returns provided by productive investments are summarized by
the rate at which voters are willing to trade off present for future consumption. Comparing the
three regimes, we see that inter-temporal consumption patterns satisfy the following:
Subsistence :
c˜1i
c˜0i
= 1, Petty :
c˜1i
c˜0i
=
1+∂F/∂Ki
1+ r
, Large :
c˜1i
c˜0i
=
1+θ/2
1+ r
. (5)
Figure 2b graphs these marginal returns to investment for each class.
These inter-temporal trade-offs determine the marginal welfare of assets and public goods. To
see this, consider the welfare transformation exp(U (Ai,P)) and note that for any economic class,
∂ exp(U (Ai,P))/∂Ai = (1+ r)/(2+ r) ·
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)1/(2+r)
. (6)
Combining Equations (5) and (6) shows that the graphs of exp(U (Ai,P)) would appear much as
in Figure 2a. As assets increase, producers initially receive low returns from subsistence, achieve
accelerated gains as Petty producers, and at the highest asset levels receive the greatest returns.
For any fixed set of Subsistence, Petty and Large producers, increases in public goods increase
the average growth rate Ei
[(
c˜1i − c˜0i
)
/c˜0i
]
. This occurs through an intensive margin, by which pro-
ducers further delay consumption, and can be understood through the intertemporal consumption
ratios of Equation (5). There it is clear that changes in public goods do not affect growth rates for
Subsistence or Large producers. Simultaneously, increases in public goods decrease investments
Ki for Petty producers while augmenting the productivity of investments, and both factors increase
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the marginal product of capital and thus c˜1i /c˜
0
i . This implication is summarized as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For any fixed set of Subsistence, Petty and Large producers, increases in public
goods increase the growth rate.
However, changes in public good provision also induce producers to adopt different production
strategies, which we now examine.
3.3 Public Goods and the Creation of a Middle Class
While all agents would in principle prefer the higher returns and welfare associated with the higher
strategy classes, two forces block them. First, fixed costs prevent lower wealth individuals from
self-financing the higher return technologies. Second, borrowing constraints prevent those same
low wealth individuals from using other’s wealth to reach the larger scales required to reap the
higher returns. Thus, an individual’s position in the endowment continuum conditions his or
her constrained optimal choice of production strategy. However, the provision of public goods
improves productive possibilities and thus alters optimal strategies. More formally, the welfare
impact of public good provision is stark across classes since
∂ exp(U (Ai,P))/∂P = (∂F/∂P)/(2+ r) ·
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)−(1+r)/(2+r)
.
Thus, Subsistence producers who do not use the production technology F have d exp(US)/dP= 0,
while the welfare of Commercial producers increases. This implies that when public goods in-
crease, the set of Commercial producers expands at the expense of Subsistence producers. Equa-
tion (7) computes the value of public goods across Commercial producers. Large producers can
fluidly move investments across periods, so absorb public goods as to achieve a return of θ/2 in
period 1, while Petty producers are constrained and achieve a return of ∂F/∂P.
∂ expUL
∂P
=
θ/2
2+ r
(
1+ r
1+θ/2
)1+r/2+r
,
∂ expUP
∂P
=
∂F/∂P
2+ r
(
1+ r
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1+r/2+r
. (7)
For a producer indifferent between Petty and Large production, Petty production implies saving on
fixed costs cP to ‘over invest’ until Ki >P. With (7), this shows ∂ exp(UP)/∂P> ∂ exp(UL)/∂P.25
Therefore increases in public goods will enlarge the Petty commercial class at the expense of the
Large Commercial class, as depicted in Figure 3a. Here the solid line represents the assets of a
producer indifferent between Petty and Subsistence classes, while the dashed line represents the
assets of a producer indifferent between Petty and Large classes. In summary, we have:
25Formally, because this implies that ∂F/∂P > θ/2 > ∂F/∂Ki for this indifferent producer.
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Proposition 2. Costless increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial class relative to
Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Figure 3: Public Goods and Class
(a) Public Goods and Class Formation (b) Numerical Production Regimes
We also claim that, absent any restrictions on the range of initial assets, the economy will
exhibit all three classes when sufficient public goods are provided. First, subsistence is always
chosen by those with insufficient assets to join the Commercial classes. Second, as P grows large,
any producer with the assets cF to join the Commercial classes would be rewarded with high
consumption in period 1, justifying any amount of low consumption in period 0. Third, producers
with assets in [cF ,cP) can afford to become Petty but cannot afford to become Large. Finally, for
any fixed level of public goods, the higher asset returns of the Large commercial class are always
rational provided sufficiently high initial assets.26 Proposition 3 summarizes this argument.
Proposition 3. Provided initial assets range from zero to infinity, economies with sufficiently high
levels of public goods will exhibit all classes.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, the adoption of technology as assets range from zero to infinity can be seen by combin-
ing Propositions 2 and 3. At high levels of public goods, there are three endogenously determined
groups of Subsistence, Petty Commodity and Large-scale producers as in Figure 3a. At low asset
levels (Ai ≤ AP), producers choose Subsistence, while for high asset levels (AL ≤ Ai), producers
26Formally, limAi→∞ d [expUL− expUS]/dAi ≥
[
(1+θ/2)1/(2+r)− (1+θ2−1/α)1/(2+r)]/(2+ r)> 0.
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join the Large commercial class. Intermediate asset levels (AP ≤ Ai ≤ AL) correspond to Petty
commercial production. These three endogenously determined groups of Subsistence, Petty Com-
modity and Large-scale producers have respective population shares
σS ≡ A(AP) , σP ≡ A(AL)−A(AP) , σL ≡ 1−A(AL) . (8)
It is of course possible that there may be no members of any particular class, as would happen,
for example, if no agent enjoys wealth in excess of AL. Using the numerical assumptions detailed in
the appendix, Figure 3b illustrates class boundaries for different levels of public goods. Individuals
whose initial wealth places them to the southwest of the solid line will optimally choose to employ
the subsistence technology. Those to the northwest of the dashed line will optimally invest in
privately provisioned public goods and join the Large Commercial class. Finally, those between
the solid and dashed lines will be in Petty Commercial Producer class. As can be seen, as the level
of public goods increases, the initial wealth level needed to exit Subsistence and join the Petty
Commercial class drops off quickly.
We represent particular societies in Figure 4. The horizontal axis represents the wealth con-
tinuum and the vertical axis represents the cumulative distribution of individuals. The solid line
represents a society with a more egalitarian initial wealth distribution, while the dashed curve rep-
resents a less egalitarian society with the same mean level of wealth. Figure 4 shows that in the
absence of public goods, 80% of the high inequality population will be in the Subsistence class,
with the remainder in the Large producer class. However, more than 80% of all wealth will be
controlled by the Large producer class. In contrast, in the low inequality economy, the absence of
public goods would imply all individuals and wealth will be in the Subsistence class.
Figure 4: High and Low Inequality Asset Distributions
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3.4 Public Policy and Political Interests
We now consider individuals’ preferences for government action. While government provision of
public goods provides a benefit to all (incipient) commercial producers, a key political question is
for whom this benefit is worth the cost. To explore this question, we need to first specify a model
of public finance that defines the government’s budget constraint. We restrict our attention to the
simple case in which the government taxes assets at a flat rate τ , or does not tax, thereby directly
increasing individuals’ private assets.27 Average wealth in the economy is µ ≡ ∫ AidA(i) so that
the total tax raised to provide public goods is τµ . As mentioned above, the provision of public
goods is a shared growth policy in the sense that it provides a benefit to all commercial producers.
It is also an inclusive growth policy as it reduces the critical initial wealth threshold, AP, allowing
more individuals to graduate from subsistence to petty commercial production.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that Large Commercial producers are the sole participants
in domestic financial markets. The resulting equilibrium interest rate of θ/2 reflects that for these
individuals, both investments and public goods yield a one period total return of 1+θ/2. Thus, the
government may borrow at interest rate θ/2 to purchase P units of the public good. The rationale
for modeling public good provision as a one period ‘rental’ is that it maintains symmetric treatment
of capital goods (which are consumed in period 1) and public goods, which are consumed by Large
Commercial producers through capital markets.28
We assume that everyone in society receives an equal per-capita share of the total public goods
provided, which is therefore equal to P. To cover the interest on this debt, the government raises
taxes τµ in period 0 and saves them for a total return of (1+θ/2)τµ in period 1 to service the
debt.29 This implies the level of public good provision must satisfy the inter-temporal budget
constraint
Government Budget Constraint : (1+θ/2)τµ = (1+θ/2)P−P, (9)
This budget constraint reflects the fact that the government can save collected taxes τµ for one
period and use its total budget to pay the debt service.
We now consider the competing effects of taxation and public good provision on well-being
27More complex tax regimes would certainly influence political outcomes. Following the analysis below, progres-
sive schemes would further antagonize Large producer support for public goods, while driving up the benefit of public
goods to Petty producers thus increasing their support for public goods.
28This is easily formalized by putting explicit government bonds in the model, whose return is fixed by opportunity
cost of investment for Large Commercial producers, 1+θ/2.
29While state capacities to literally implement this type of tax may be lacking, many government policies form
implicit taxes which are enacted in practice such as tariffs, royalties collected from natural resources or existing
monopolies, choices made in state owned sectors, etc.
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across economic classes. The total effects of government policy for any Commercial class are30
dU/dτ = (1+θ/2)µ/(θ/2) ·∂U/∂P−Ai ·dU/dAi. (10)
Equation (10) sets the beneficial effect of public good provision against the detrimental costs of
taxation, and characterizes the policy regime that each individual would support politically.
For Subsistence Producers, the lack of access to the production technology F implies ∂U/∂P=
0, so they pay taxes with no hope of compensation and would prefer that no taxes are levied. At
the other extreme, members of the Large Commercial class are free to reduce Pi to offset increases
in P, so they are immune to ‘forced purchase’ of public goods. Therefore a Large Commercial
Producer’s welfare increases in τ so long as the tax paid, τAi is less than the discounted value of
public goods provided in period 1, so Equation (10) becomes31
dUL/dτ = (µ−Ai) ·dUL/dAi. (11)
Equation (11) shows members of the Large Commercial class prefer higher taxes only when their
assets are below average, so for this class, taxes are purely redistributive. Clearly then, the wealth-
iest members of the society will oppose the taxation needed for a shared growth policy.
Finally, for Petty Commercial Producers, Equation (10) can be written
dUP/dτ =
 µ−Ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redistributive
+
[
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+∂F/∂Ki
−1
]
µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit of Public Goods
 ·dUP/dAi.
Decomposing this equation shows that Petty producers are motivated by both redistributive con-
cerns and the productive benefits of public goods. For a Petty producer who happens to equate
the marginal product of private and public investments (Ki = P), the benefit term above vanishes
as for Large producers.32 Petty producers with more assets increase private investment, making
the benefit term positive, since the potential return of public goods to such producers is higher
than the opportunity cost of providing public goods, θ/2. Similarly, Petty producers with fewer
assets achieve returns on public goods below θ/2, yielding a negative benefit term. Ultimately, the
combined effects are positive so long as taxes aren’t prohibitively high.33
30An increase in taxes τ decreases available assets at rate Ai, as ∂U/∂τ|P fixed = −Ai · dU/dAi, so the impact of
taxation is known from (6) above. Conversely, an increase in τ provides public goods to all voters at rate P/τ =
(1+ θ/2)µ/θ/2, which implies ∂U/∂τ|(1−τ)Ai fixed = (1+θ/2)µ/(θ/2) ·dU/dP.
31Formally, the envelope theorem shows that ∂U/∂P = ((∂F/∂P)/(2+ r)) · (c˜0i /c˜1i ) ·dU/dAi.
32The condition of Proposition 3 guarantees this Petty producer exists.
33While the costless provision of public goods enlarges the Petty Commercial class, the taxation required for these
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Informed by this analysis, we restrict τ to moderate levels in order to analyze economies where
public goods have some positive benefit for Petty producers, i.e. that taxes have not immiserated
producers into highly unproductive behaviors, as laid in Assumption 1. Conditions 1 and 2 of this
assumption means that the class boundaries above do not violate producers ability to pay for their
preferred class plus a small margin, and in order to be violated, taxes have to approach 1/(2+ r),
i.e. almost 50% at standard discount rates. For condition 3 to be violated at tax rates below 50%
would require extremely high marginal returns to public goods of over 200%.
Assumption 1. Moderate taxation.
1. (1− τ)AP− cF > (1+ r)τAP.
2. (1− τ)AL− cP > 0.
3. 1− ∂F/∂P|Ai=AL /4≥ τ .
Under moderate taxation, all Petty producers receive positive marginal benefits from increased
taxation. We summarize these political interests as
Proposition 4. The political interests of Large producers are redistributive, while Petty producers
care also about the productive benefits of public goods. Under moderate taxation:
1. dUL/dτ ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ Ai.
2. dUP/dτ ≥ 0 for all Ai ≥ AP.
Proof. See Appendix.
While we have seen that costless increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial class,
the introduction of taxes to pay for public goods introduces income effects which might also shrink
this class. However, at moderate tax rates, the productive benefits of publicly augmenting private
investments dominate income effects, as summarized in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Under moderate taxation, increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial
class relative to Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Proof. See Appendix.
Until now, we have exogenously modeled public good provision. We now model public goods
as the outcome of a political contest between parties who are lobbied along class lines.
goods drains producers of wealth, potentially disincentivizing high return production. The most obvious way this
might occur is under prohibitively high taxes which preclude producers from paying the fixed costs of adoption. For
example, at a 100% taxation rate, all producers are immiserated to subsistence by the lack of assets to pay cF .
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4 Political Parties and Electoral Competition
In this section, we lay out a model of electoral competition in which the economic strength of
classes manifests through lobbying.34 We then establish the behavior of political parties and an-
alyze the resulting political-economic equilibrium. All voters have random political preferences
that make them more likely to vote for one of the two political parties. Voters involved in the
commercial economy are informed and tend to vote and lobby for their economic interest.35 Unin-
formed voters are swayed by political expenditures made by the parties. In our modeling, we pay
particular attention to each agent’s constrained willingness to pay for a particular policy. We then
explore the suggestion that the extent of initial asset inequality and risk will fundamentally shape
whether the political-economic processes will result in the choice of shared growth policies.
4.1 Voters, Parties and Lobbies
To explore the politics of policy choice, we assume a two-party political system consisting of Red
(R) and Green (G) parties. Parties are office motivated and offer platforms (τR,PR) and (τG,PG)
composed of a flat income tax τ used to finance public goods P through the government budget
constraint (9).36 Voters have idiosyncratic preferences δi in favor of party R, distributed uniformly
over [−1/2ψ,1/2ψ], where ψ determines the range and density of political preferences. Petty and
Large Commercial producers are informed voters who vote on the basis of economic policy. The
welfare of an informed voter i under a platform (τ,P) is
U ((1− τ)Ai,P)+δi ·1R elected.
Therefore commercial voters prefer a Red platform over a Green platform whenever
U ((1− τR)Ai,PR)+δi ≥U ((1− τG)Ai,PG) .
34Of course, this presumes a democratic political regime (at at least a regime in which elections are de jure de-
termined by votes but de facto in part determined by bribing or deluding voters. This likely better reflects the latter
stages of East Asian success as democracy was consolidated. Similar results that realistically reflect the more auto-
cratic regimes in place at the beginning of the East Asian ‘miracle’ would likely follow based on the same production
technologies here but under the implicit threat of insurgency, e.g. (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
35A lobby might also be interpreted as a broad based interest group represent common economic interests. More
directly, instead of modeling lobbies, one could presume that parties directly pursue welfare maximization for their
constitutency, which would reparamaterize the model but look very much the same in terms of policy equilibria.
36We abstract from factors that might influence the application of taxes towards public good provision, such as
government leakages or the capacity of politicians to effectively provide public goods once funds are allocated. The
role of these factors when local politics are distinct or fractionalized is an area for further work (Gehlbach, 2006).
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Subsistence producers are uninformed as public goods do not directly impact them.37 Instead, they
are swayed by campaign contributions CR and CG, and vote for the Red party whenever
CR+δi ≥CG.
Given party platforms and contributions, the probability that the Red party is elected (ρ) is:
ρ = 1/2+ψ
∫ ∞
AP
[U ((1− τR)Ai,PR)−U ((1− τG)Ai,PG)]dA(i)+ψ
∫ AP
0
[CR−CG]dA(i) .
Once parties have chosen platforms to maximize their election chances, commercial lobbies make
campaign contributions.
A Large Commercial lobby and a Petty Commercial lobby provide contributions towards par-
ties which maximize the aggregate welfare of their constituencies. We assume per capita contribu-
tions incur a quadratic welfare cost, so that for a given platform (τ,P), the aggregate welfare for
Large producers (UL) and Petty producers (UP) is
UL (τ,P) =
∫ ∞
AL
[
U ((1− τ)Ai,P)− ((CR+CG)/σL)2 /2
]
dA(i) ,
UP (τ,P) =
∫ AL
AP
[
U ((1− τ)Ai,P)− ((CR+CG)/σP)2 /2
]
dA(i) .
As elections are probabalistic, the Large Commercial lobby makes contributions to solve
max
CR,CG
ρ (CR,CG)UL (τR,PR,CR,CG)+ [1−ρ (CR,CG)]UL (τG,PG,CR,CG) .
Similarly, the Petty Commercial lobby contributes according to
max
CR,CG
ρUP (τR,PR)+ [1−ρ]UP (τG,PG) .
Once contributions are allocated, voters elect parties, the winner’s platform is implemented,
and voters produce. Note that all of these stages are contingent on the fixed costs paid by vot-
ers which determine their class, which in turn depend on a rational expectation of the political
outcome. We now turn to examine when such expectations are in fact equilibrium outcomes.
37Similar to Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), this implies that the share of informed voters increases with wealth.
Our assumption that the poorest voters are uninformed permits the added complexity of endogenous group formation.
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4.2 Equilibrium
With these building blocks, we take a standard approach and model the behavior of class-based
lobbies. As is well known in this setting, (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Gehlbach, 2013), in equi-
librium each party selects the same platform and no contributions are made. Equilibrium platforms
coincide with the solution to a weighted sum of Petty and Large Commercial Producer welfare:38
max
(τ,P)
(1+ψσL)UL (τ,P)+(1+ψσP)UP (τ,P) subject to (9). (12)
Of the range of possible equilibrium tax rates between zero and one, extremely high tax rates
(e.g. τ = 1) will not be offered by parties. This is for the simple reason that the high levels of public
goods thereby provided are of low value to voters with few assets left after taxes. Conversely, low
expectations of public good provision could lead to an anemic Petty class (UP = 0), allowing for a
corner solution to Equation (12) of no public goods (τ = 0). However, in the presence of a middle
class (UP > 0), Petty producers enforce public good provision politically. To see this, examine the
first order condition for Equation (12) to hold at an interior equilibrium:
0 = (1+ψσL)
(
dUL (τ,P)/dτ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost of τ to Large Producers
+ (1+ψσP)
(
dUP (τ,P)/dτ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit of τ to Petty Producers
. (13)
As the marginal benefit of public goods to Petty producers is arbitrarily high at low tax rates in
Equation (13), the existence of a middle class guarantees at least some positive level of public
goods. This yields Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The only class structure compatible with no public good provision is an economy
composed solely of Subsistence and Large Commercial Producers.
These results show that the strength of a class to pursue its interests in the political arena depend
on the fixed investments voters make. Since investments in turn depend on the expected level of
public goods provided by politicians, good and bad expectations can lead to inclusive or exclusive
policies. We now address these outcomes by investigating voter interests as class strength changes.
4.3 Inequality, Risk and Public Good Provision
The initial distribution of assets impacts public good provision through Equation (13). To see this,
note that in light of Proposition 4, voters with assets greater than max{AL,µ} prefer lower taxes
and voters with fewer assets down to AP prefer higher taxes. Now consider two economies with
38Note that this political-economic outcome does not strictly reflect output or welfare maximization, as we might
expect for theoretical and empirical reasons. See Cheibub and Przeworski (1997).
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identical technologies, but one with asset distribution A and another with asset distribution B that
exhibits a stronger (incipient) Petty class. Formally, suppose B results from A by redistributing
from rich voters with Ai > max
{
A1L,µ
}
) to poorer voters so that there are more voters at every
asset level below max
{
A1L,µ
}
. In this second B economy, Equation (13) must be positive at the
equilibrium tax rate of A. As (13) decreases in τ for any fixed set of producers under moderate
taxation (see Appendix), it follows that a B distribution economy has a higher equilibrium tax rate.
This result, linking the relative strength of Petty producers more equal economies to increased
public goods is Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under moderate taxation, economies with a stronger incipient Petty class have
higher levels of public goods.
Risk also prevents voters from adopting higher productivity technologies and thereby reduces
the size of the incipient Petty class. Thus, reducing risk may in fact crowd in public goods, which
we now explain.
In order to model high yielding technologies which may entail risk, further suppose that com-
mercial production yields variable total returns of c1i = [F (Ki,κi)+Ki+Pi] ·ωi where ωi is ran-
domly distributed with E [ωi] = 1 and support on
[
θ2−1/α − r,∞
)
. This implies commercial pro-
duction always yields higher returns than subsistence, but risk as measured by Ω≡ |E [lnωi]|makes
Commercial production less rewarding. Increases in riskΩ do not change the relative attractiveness
of Petty versus Large Commercial production across asset levels, but risk does make Subsistence
more appealing than Commercial production. Thus, risk increases AP and shrinks the Petty class.
Following the logic above through Equation (13), decreases in risk thereby crowds in political
capital in support of public goods, summarized as Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Under moderate taxation, less risky economies have higher levels of public goods.
Propositions 7 and 8 thus show that while both inequality and risk decrease public good provi-
sion, there is a trade off between the two under which governments will provide the same level of
public goods. We next illustrate the mechanisms of the model with an example to fix ideas.
4.4 Endogenous Class and Willingness to Pay for Public Policy
In an effort to understand each agent’s potential budget-constrained willingness to make political
contributions off the equilibrium path (where contributions are zero), we perform a thought ex-
periment wherein a Reform party tactically promises public good provision in the face of a Status
Quo party that offers none. This illustrates the impetus behind political contributions that shapes
equilibrium outcomes, by calculating how much initial wealth each voter would be willing to give
up in order to obtain (or avoid) the Reform policy with probability one.
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These amounts calculated can be considered as upper bound estimates of the political contri-
butions the Reform party could collect. While individuals would likely contribute less than this
upper-bound estimate (given electoral uncertainty, among other things), these estimates do provide
a window into the interaction between politics and economics.
Figure 5 displays the percentage of initial wealth that an individual could pay to their preferred
political party without making themselves worse off compared to the policy of their non-preferred
party. For example, at P = 50 on the horizontal axis, a voter willing to contribute 5% of their
wealth would be indifferent between (i) a 5% contribution plus implementation of P = 50 and (ii)
the status quo (P= 0). Asset positions that show negative amounts means that the individual could
contribute that amount to secure a Status Quo win.
Figure 5: Upper Bound Estimates of Political Willingness to Pay
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As can be appreciated in Figure 5, the strongest potential support for reform policies emerge
from what might be termed the incipient Petty Commercial class. Note that at low levels of public
good provision, voters with wealth levels of between 200 and 600 optimally pursue the subsis-
tence strategy. At those modest wealth levels, it never makes economic sense for them to pursue
commercial production. However, if the government delivers roughly 20 units of public good or
more, then individuals at this wealth level optimally transition to the petty commercial class. These
incipient Petty producers would become informed and be able to contribute positive, but modest
amounts of their wealth to insure the election of a reform policy. The willingness to pay of this
group increases up until public good levels of at least 70 units.
Notably, such endogenous support for public goods ‘led by the middle class’ means that the
distribution and provision of public goods are not independent. For example, for a fixed govern-
ment budget the distribution of public goods might fail anti-poverty objectives (as in Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006), but the size of the budget may be in proportion to the political strength of Petty
producers. When the economic environment is constrained by such political realities, the policies
which maximally reduce poverty may be those which form common cause with other groups, as
this ‘imprecise targeting’ is precisely what garners political capital.
From an informed voter perspective, with P = 0, individuals with wealth in excess of about
600 units would provide their own public goods (Pi > 0), pursuing the Large Commercial strategy.
However, because these individuals are all above the mean wealth level in the economy (µ = 260
in the numerical example), they strictly lose from the implementation of a reform policy. While
a further exposition of the contest between parties is laid out in Appendix C, we now turn to a
numerical example of equilibrium outcomes.
4.5 Political Poverty Traps and Endogenous Class Formation
Finally, combining these different class interests across promised public good levels yields Figures
6a and 6b. The horizontal axis of these Figures contains the expected level of public goods voters
credibly might expect, while the vertical axis plots the level of public goods that are the political
outcome when voters invest based on expectations.
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(a) High Asset Inequality (b) Low Asset Inequality
Figure 6: Political-Economic Equilibria
Figure 6a depicts a low public good equilibrium at P = 0 wherein a weak Petty Commercial
Class (see Figure 3b) cannot obtain any positive level of public goods from the government. The
same Figure also depicts a high public good equilibrium at P ≈ 75 where an incipient middle
class, formed by expectations of high public good provision can ensure this level of public goods
politically. Here the political poverty trap is evident: sustaining a low to moderate level of public
goods can make Petty producers of sufficient interest to political entrepreneurs to pursue a high
level of public goods in equilibrium. In contrast, the low asset inequality economy of Figure 6b
has a unique equilibrium of high public good provision as the high asset interest groups which act
against the taxation that public goods entail are considerably weaker.39
The potential for no public good provision (a la Proposition 6) can be clearly seen in the high
inequality economy of Figure 6a. In contrast, the economy of Figure 6b consists solely of Subsis-
tence and Petty producers. These dominant Petty producers maximize their average class welfare
by setting the RHS of Equation (13) to zero, achieving a high level of public good provision in
equilibrium.
39As is common in models of political public good provision, the conditions which pin down the number and
particular properties of equilibria are highly endogenous, e.g. Benabou (2000).
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4.6 Breaking the Political Poverty Trap
More broadly, this political poverty trap can be broken when political parties can credibly promise
to deliver a minimal threshold of public goods, which brings voters into the Petty commercial class
and crowds in both physical and political capital to support inclusive growth. This relationship is
depicted in both Figure 6a and Figure 6b, which show that the level of public goods provided
by political contests increases as voters come to expect them. This is analytically formalized as
Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. Assume moderate taxation and that there are sufficient Petty producers (σP) who
receive high benefits of taxation (dUP/dτ|Ai=AL) relative to Large producers and the benefits they
receive:
σP · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > σL · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL . (14)
Then increases in expected public goods crowd in delivered public goods.
Proof. Equation (14) means that when considering the benefits of taxation to a voter indifferent
between Petty and Large production, the benefit to Petty production weighted by the mass of Petty
producers is larger than the corresponding quantity for Large production. This will hold whenever
the value of public goods are high or when the Large Commercial class is relatively small. For the
formal proof, see Appendix.
Note that parallel to asset based poverty traps, here non-convexities in production manifest as
non-convexities in politics. As exhibited in Figure 6a, a discrete jump in promised public goods is
required to garner any possibility of politically enforced public goods.
We now briefly discuss the role of risk which is endemic to small entrepreneurs in developing
countries and crucially shapes their economic lives. In this framework, risk alters production
strategies which in turn informs the political interests of producers. Thus, risk has spillover effects
on the national development strategy akin to the role of initial inequality.
5 Viable Producers as the Foundation for Inclusive Growth
While highly stylized, our political economy model implies that in the presence of high levels of
risk, the kinds of shared growth policies that underwrote the rural foundations of the East Asian
miracle are not politically viable, even in economies with modest levels of asset inequality. Before
turning to consider what might be done to rectify that situation, it is important to recall that the
model itself rests on an assumption of financial market failure. Formally, it is the inability of low
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wealth agents to borrow large amounts of resources that keep them from leapfrogging from the
subsistence to the Petty Commercial class and higher rates of returns to the assets that they own.40
While this assumption seems reasonable, it is essentially a statement that low wealth agents are of
no more interest to economic entrepreneurs than they are to political entrepreneurs. As exhibited in
the last section, risk plays a key role in this exclusionary process, and reductions in risk may have
political knock on effects. We now speculate on the policy implications of our political economy
framework for the likelihood that polities might support and sustain inclusive growth policies,
taking Africa as an example.
5.1 The Political Ramifications of Risk in Africa
Risk plays an important part in explaining rural financial market failures. Only a tiny fraction
of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, in sharp contrast to other world regions.41
While the absence of irrigation reduces productivity, it also has a large impact on the risk to which
farmers are exposed. In an analysis of West Africa, Carter (1997) documents the magnitude of
this risk, showing not only that is larger than other world regions, but also that if left unmanaged
exposes households to huge consumption risk. Households of course do manage that risk, but often
by avoiding higher yielding, but risky and more expensive technologies.
Should the higher yielding technology exhibit risk in the model above, investment incentives to
abandon subsistence would be reduced as agents would be tempted to consume more in the initial
period rather than risking resources in investment projects which perhaps do not pay off. As shown
in Figure (3ab), it is this class that sacrifices the most to invest by having already precariously low
period 0 consumption. In addition, as already demonstrated in dynamic poverty trap models, an
increase in risk pushes out the initial asset level at which individuals will attempt the transition
from a low-level equilibrium strategy to a higher level equilibrium strategy.42
These two fundamental changes brought by risk have important implications for political econ-
omy. For a given initial asset distribution, the rightward shift in AP thins the ranks of those who
support Government investment in public goods. In addition, for those who remain Petty Com-
modity Producers, it reduces their material gain from policies that promote public goods. Together,
these two forces imply that a broader class of wealth distributions will not be able to endogenously
sustain inclusive growth policies. Put differently, office-seeking political entrepreneurs have little
40Our model shares this characteristic with the general category of multiple equilibrium poverty trap models ana-
lyzed by Barrett and Carter (2013).
41The 2008 World Development Report indicates that less than 5% of land is irrigated in Africa, compared to 39%
in South Asia and 29% in East Asia.
42E.g. in the frame work of Carter and Ikegami (2009), this impact appears as a shift out in what they call the Mi-
cawber Frontier. In our model, it will appear as rightward shift in AP, the asset level at which individuals endogenously
move from the subsistence class to the petty commodity class.
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to gain from offering public goods to a population that will remain trapped at relatively low levels
of economic well-being even after public goods are provided. Risk, especially at the levels ob-
served across wide parts of rural Africa, not only discourages investment, but also fundamentally
breaks the political-economic logic that could create and sustain inclusive growth policies.
5.2 Policy Interventions Through the Lens of Political Economy
Models, such as the one developed in this paper that indicates that initial conditions matter, are
problematic in terms of their policy implications. The Peruvian economist, Adolfo Figueroa, once
commented that Latin America needed a “refoundational shock” to reduce asset inequality so that
it could start over with different initial conditions. While the desirability and certainly political
feasibility of a refoundational shock are questionable, is it any more reasonable to think about
changing the foundational agroecological conditions across parts of Africa that trap individuals in
situations in which they are of little interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer to this question may be yes. Recent years have seen an
outpouring of efforts to index insurance contracts that transfer the correlated component of risk out
of African agricultural systems. Janzen and Carter (2013) show that insurance payments to herders
in remote pastoral regions of Northern Kenya have indeed served to guard family consumption
standards and to protect families from further asset loss and decapitalization. As described by
McIntosh et al. (2013), weather index insurance contract targeted at low productivity Ethiopian
grain farmers provided the liquidity needed to adopt improved seeds and fertilizers. The hope
is that this new source of liquidity, combined with the risk reduction of the insurance contract
would crowd-in technology uptake and, in the language of the model here, create a transition from
a Subsistence to a Petty Commercial class. With modest public investment, these projects have
tried to change the landscape for economic entrepreneurs, converting low wealth households into
a bankable investment project. If these efforts can indeed succeed and sustain themselves, then the
political economic calculus of the sort examined here may turn in change, creating a novel variant
of the virtuous circle that underlay the East Asian Miracle a generation ago.
6 Conclusion
This paper models endogenous class formation wherein agents’ productive choices, votes and in-
terests depend on their assets and emergent political equilibrium. Increases in public goods are
inclusive, enlarging a Petty Commercial class and increasing growth rates by rationalizing invest-
ment in more productive technologies. This ‘crowded in’ Petty Commercial class has increased
votes and income which politically reinforces public good provision, leading to increasing returns
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in politics. As with other increasing returns models, this may result in multiple equilibria with low
or high levels of public goods, and we show when increases in expected public good provision
(perhaps backed by new movements, ideologies, leaders or geopolitical conditions) increase the
equilibrium public goods provided by politicians. Conversely, societies with low expectations of
public good provision face an economically and politically anemic Petty Commercial class. We
have also shown that low inequality and risk strengthen the incipient middle class and increase the
responsiveness of government policy to their interests.
Within the context of a wider argument that economic interventions have political dimensions
that need consideration when crafting policy, the model illustrates underlying interconnections
between the economic and political realms. Specifically considering the selection of inclusive
growth policies in development and the role of risk, we have discussed the potential for recent
interventions to expand the Petty Commercial class, which could have political knock-on effects.
Future work might test or craft interventions (and subsequent monitoring) with these considerations
in mind. This could help policymakers more deeply understand and shape the political forces set
in motion by economic policy.
This paper has focused on conflicting political interests played out in a democratic setting, al-
beit one in which wealth may heavily influence policy outcomes. How these conflicts play out
under alternative political institutions such as autocracies (e.g. De Luca et al., 2013), which there-
after transition to democracies, could yield a more complete narrative exploring the influence of
inequality on inclusive growth.43 The existence of multiple equilibria as exhibited here might
also motivate a more stylized setting wherein voter-producers face a distribution over political
outcomes which impacts class formation and therefore political interests. A political landscape
inhabited by widely divergent, but electable parties (or the potential for coups) might inhibit the
formation of a Petty Commercial class and therefore sabotage stable political-economic public sup-
port for widespread commercial engagement. This might speak to the mixed relationship between
democracy and growth (see the review of Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) as only consolidated
democracies which have escaped low level equilibria might have growth advantages over autocra-
cies.
Finally, one interpretation of our results is that a more equitable distribution of wealth may
trigger virtuous growth cycles. However, distinct from mechanisms in other research, here we
emphasize the role of an incipient middle class to be of interest to political entrepreneurs through
special interest politics. It is the size of this class that politically ensures public good provision,
and thus decreases in inequality are meaningful only insofar as they strengthen this group relative
43Indeed, there is evidence that the accumulation of human capital generates later improvement in political insti-
tutions (Glaeser et al., 2004). If human capital is complementary to commercial production as modelled here, then
human capital accumulation would later improve institutions and growth simultaneously.
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to the wealthy: in our setting, only such ‘targetted’ policies or events change the political calculus,
in line with evidence as provided by Acemoglu et al. (2005). This suggests that the empirical tests
of the relationship between inequality and growth might be confounded by the fact that it is not
overall inequality, but rather the balance of economic strength between actors above a certain asset
threshold that matters for inclusive growth.
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A Proofs
Proposition. Provided initial assets range from zero to infinity, economies with sufficiently high
levels of public goods will exhibit all classes. A sufficient level of public goods is
1+
cF
P
≤ (1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
[
2+ r
1+ r
[
1+θ/2
1+ r
]1/(2+r)
−1
]
. (15)
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Proof. For a Petty producer with assets such that Ki = P, say A˜P, the producer’s intertemporal
decision implies
(1− τ) A˜P =
[
1+
(1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
]
P+ cF . (16)
Since a Large producer with assets A˜P would also choose Ki = P, clearly UP > UL since cP > 0.
Using the expressions above, Petty production dominates subsistence at A˜P exactly when(
(1− τ) A˜P−P− cF
)
[(1+θ/2)/(1+ r)]1/(2+r) ≥ (1+ r)(1− τ) A˜P/(2+ r) .
With equation (16), this is equivalent to[
1+
(1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
]
P+ cF ≥ P+ cF
1− (1+ r)/(2+ r) · [(1+ r)/(1+θ/2)]1/(2+r)
,
which implies both (15) and that (1− τ) A˜P > cF so that Petty production is accessible.
Proposition. The political interests of Large producers are redistributive, while Petty producers
care also about the productive benefits of public goods. Under moderate taxation:
1. dUL/dτ ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ Ai.
2. dUP/dτ ≥ 0 for all Ai ≥ AP.
Proof. Consider that at Ai = AP, substitution shows
dUP
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AP
=
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AP
=
1+θ/2
θ/2
(θ/2)Pα−1 (Kαi /2+P
α/2)(1−α)/α c˜0i
(1+ r) c˜1i
µ−AP.
Clearly c˜0i /c˜
1
i = ((1− τ)AP−Ki− cF)/(F +Ki) decreases in Ki, so evaluating at Ki = 0 shows
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AP ≥
1+θ/2
θ/2
(θ/2)Pα−1 (Pα/2)(1−α)/α ((1− τ)AP− cF)
(1+ r)θP2−1/α
µ−AP
= [(1− (2+ r)τ)AP− cF ]/(1+ r)τ,
which is positive so long as investible period 0 assets, (1− τ)AP− cF are greater than (1+ r)τAP
as assumed. Also note that (1− τ)AP− cF > (1+ r)τAP with cF ≥ 0 implies τ ≤ 1/(2+ r), so
(1− τ)Ai− cF > (1+ r)τAi for all Ai ≥ AP. Replacing AP with Ai ≥ AP in the argument above
then gives the result.
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Proposition. Under moderate taxation, increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial
class relative to Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Proof. What is needed is to show that as τ increases, ALincreases and AP decreases. First consider
that for producers indifferent between Petty and Large production at asset level AL, Equations (10)
and (6) imply the benefits of Petty production dominate as taxes increase (dUP/dτ ≥ dUL/dτ) iff
(µ−AL)
(
1+θ/2
1+ r
)1/(2+r)
≤
(
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AL
)(
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+ r
)1/(2+r)
. (17)
Further reduction shows Equation (17) holds exactly when
(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1/2+r[
1−
(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1+r/2+r ∂F/∂P
θ/2
]
≤
[(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1/2+r
−1
]
AL
µ
. (18)
At AL, a Petty producer would necessarily use the saved fixed costs cP from not becoming a Large
producer to invest in assets Ki > P, it follows that ∂F/∂Ki < θ/2 < ∂F/∂P, so the RHS of
Equation (18) is positive, while the LHS is negative. Therefore dUP/dτ ≥ dUL/dτ at AL, so the
Petty class expands at the expense of the Large class. Similarly, for producers indifferent between
Petty and Subsistence production at asset level AP, Equations (10) and (6) imply that dUS/dτ ≤ 0
while dUP/dτ ≥ 0 under moderate taxation. Therefore as taxes increase, Petty producers expand
at the expense of the Subsistence producers.
Lemma. d2UP/d2τ < 0 for all Petty producers as long as the marginal return on public goods at
AL is less than 4
√
1− τ .
Proof. From the envelope theorem, dUP/dτ =
[
1/c˜0i ∂F/∂P/c˜
1
i
]
·
[
−Ai P/τ
]
so
d2UP
d2τ
=−
[
−Ai
P/τ
]T [ (
dc˜0i /dAi
)
/
(
c˜0i
)2 (dc˜0i /dP)/(c˜0i )2(
dc˜0i /dP
)
/
(
c˜0i
)2 d (∂F/∂P/c˜1i )/dP
][
−Ai
P/τ
]
.
Further reduction shows that
d2UP
d2τ
=
−1(
c˜0i
)2
[
−Ai
P/τ
]T  dc˜0i /dAi dc˜0i /dP
dc˜0i /dP
(1+r)2
(1+∂F/∂Ki)
2
[
dc˜1i/dP · ∂F/∂P− c˜1i · ∂ 2F/∂ 2P
]
[ −Ai
P/τ
]
,
so that d2UP/d2τ < 0 iff
dc˜0i
dAi
A2i +
(1+ r)2
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2
[
dc˜1i
dP
· ∂F/∂P− c˜1i · ∂ 2F/∂ 2P
](
P
τ
)2
>
(
dc˜0i
dP
)2
Ai
P
τ
. (19)
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The LHS of Equation (19), is positive which follows from
dc˜0i
dAi
= (1− τ)− dKi
dAi
= (1− τ) (1+ r)− ∂
2F/∂ 2Ki · c˜0i /(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
(2+ r)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki · c˜0i /(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
> (1− τ) (1+ r)
(2+ r)
,
and noting ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki,∂ 2F/∂ 2P < 0 < ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki, combined with
dc˜1i
dP
· ∂F/∂P = ∂F/∂P
1+ r
[
∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i +
[
∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki− (1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
] dKi
dP
]
= ∂F/∂P
[
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki +
1+ ∂F/∂Ki− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
∂F/∂P
]
> (∂F/∂P)2 /(2+ r) .
Thus, for Equation (19) to hold, it is sufficient that
(1− τ) (1+ r)
(2+ r)
A2i +
(1+ r)2
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2
(∂F/∂P)2
2+ r
(
P
τ
)2
≥
(
dc˜0i
dP
)2
Ai
P
τ
. (20)
The RHS of Equation (20) is bounded above by
(
(1+r)∂F/∂P
(2+r)(1+∂F/∂Ki)−∂2F/∂2Ki
)2
AiP/τ because
dc˜0i
dP
=
(1+ r)∂F/∂P− ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
=
(θ/2)(1+ r)
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
K1−αi (K
α
i /2+P
α/2)+α (θ/2)(Kαi /2+P
α/2)1/α − (1−α)(Ki/2)
K1−αi P1−α [(2+ r)(1+D1F)−D11F ]
(
Kαi /2+Pα/2
)(2α−1)/α
> 0
and ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i > 0. Therefore to show Equation (20), it is sufficient to show
(1− τ)(2+ r)A2i (1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2 /(1+ r)+(2+ r)(∂F/∂P)2 (P/τ)2 ≥ (∂F/∂P)2 AiP/τ.
This holds exactly when[
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
√
(1− τ)(2+ r)/(1+ r)Ai− ∂F/∂P ·
√
(2+ r)(P/τ)
]2
≥
[
(∂F/∂P)2−2(∂F/∂P)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)(2+ r)
√
(1− τ)/(1+ r)
]
Ai (P/τ) ,
which implies the result.
Proposition. Assume moderate taxation and that there are sufficient Petty producers (σP) who
receive high benefits of taxation (dUP/dτ|Ai=AL) relative to Large producers and the benefits they
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receive:
σP · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > σL · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL . (21)
Then increases in expected public goods crowd in delivered public goods.
Proof. Recall the first order condition for interior equilibria of Equation (13).44 Holding the polit-
ically determined level of public goods (say P) constant, now consider what happens in (13) when
the level of expected public goods (say P∗) increases. Since AL and AP are functions of expected
public goods only, differentiating Equation (13) with respect to P∗, we have
ψ
dσL
dP∗
∫ ∞
AL
(µ−Ai) dULdAi dA(i)+ψ
dσP
dP∗
∫ AL
AP
(
∂F/∂P(1+θ/2)
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)θ/2
µ−Ai
)
dUP
dAi
dA(i) (22)
− (1+ψσL) (µ−AL)
dUL
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AL
dAL
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AL) (23)
+(1+ψσP)
(
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2
µ−AL
)
dUP
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AL
dAL
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AL) (24)
− (1+ψσP)
(
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2
µ−AP
)
dUP
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AP
dAP
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AP) (25)
By breaking down Equations (22-25), we will show that the entire expression is positive. We first
claim that (22) must be positive. This is because, under moderate taxes, the second term on the
RHS of (13) is positive and dσP/dP∗ > 0. Consequently, the first term on the LHS of (13) must
be positive and dσL/dP∗ < 0, so (22) is positive. Second, (25) is positive because dAP/dP∗ < 0,
clearly dUP/dAi > 0 and under moderate taxes,
(
∂F/∂P
1+∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2 µ−AP
)
> 0. Finally, (22-25) is
then positive if (23-24) can be shown to be positive, which holds exactly when
(1+ψσP) · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > (1+ψσL) · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL .
Since Proposition 5 has shown dUP/dτ|Ai=AL ≥ dUL/dτ|Ai=AL , a sufficient condition for (22-25)
to be positive is σP · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > σL · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL .
Since (22-25) is positive, if (13) decreases in P, then increases in expected public goods P∗
increase public goods delivered in equilibrium. This follows if d2UL/d2τ < 0 and d2UP/d2τ < 0.
It can be shown directly that d2UL/d2τ < 0,45 and the Lemma above shows d2UP/d2τ < 0.
44At the unique corner solution of P = 0, clearly no change in public good provision occurs until an interior equi-
librium of P > 0 binds, so public good provision weakly increases.
45Specifically, d2UL/d2τ =− [−(1+ r)(1+θ/2)Ai+ r (1+θ/2)µ]2 /
[
(1+ r)(1+θ/2) c˜0i + r (1+θ/2)τµ
]2
.
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B Numerical Details
The numerical simulations in the main text have the same preferences, production parameters
and mean asset level of 260, but vary in the distribution of assets. The low inequality economy
has an initial asset distribution that is inverse Pareto of Pr(A≤ a) = (a/400)1.85 while the high
inequality economy has an initial asset distribution satisfying Pr(A≤ a) = (a/1000).351. The latter
distribution is based on the distribution of land ownership in Nicaragua of the 1970s.
The discount rate in both economies is 1/1.1 for an interest rate of 10%. The common produc-
tion parameters are α = 1/5 and θ = .8 (so that the return to F in the absence of public goods is
.025). The fixed costs of production are given by cF = 25 and cP = 45. In the political simulations,
the density of party preference shocks corresponds to ψ = 4.
C Expected Electoral Outcomes and Equilibrium Policy
Given these economic fundamentals, how will electoral politics work? Figure 7 shows the likely
political fate of the Reform party for different public good platforms (shown on the horizontal
axis) in opposition to a P = 0 Status Quo party. The solid (red) line shows expected net votes for
the Reform party minus votes for the Status Quo party including both informed and uninformed
voters, when classes are formed expecting P = 0. Similarly, the long-dashed (blue) lines shows
the net voting preference of informed voters. The short-dashed line (green) graphs informed voter
support when classes are formed based on expected public goods P > 0 as on the horizontal axis.
All net vote percentages are displayed as a fraction of the overall population of the society.
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Figure 7: Net Votes for Reform Party
(a) High inequality (b) Low Inequality
We now consider politics and policy under the low and high inequality scenarios displayed
above in Figure 4. The high inequality scenario approximates Latin American levels of agrarian
inequality, with the wealthiest 20% of the population controlling 80% of the wealth. The low
inequality scenario approximates an East Asian scenario in which an asset ownership ceiling has
been imposed (akin to what happened in many East Asian economies during the World War II era).
Under the high inequality scenario displayed in panel (a) of Figure 7, both informed and total net
votes for the Reform party are overwhelmingly negative, especially for small steps away from the
P = 0 status quo. It is of course the money the informed voters (large scale commercial producers
in this case) that drive the votes of the large mass of uninformed voters. Even if the Reform party
radically promises a policy of relatively high taxes and public good provision, net votes still remain
negative. Wealth inequality in this case continues to drive politics even though more individuals
become informed and interested in supporting public good policies.
It is important stress here that politics are here being driven by the same liquidity constraints
that drive production choices. Individuals must self-finance their own investment through reduced
consumption. Similarly, the assumed borrowing constraint prevents voters from borrowing to fi-
nance the election of a party that would improve their economic well-being.
Panel b of Figure 7 displays expected electoral outcomes under the low initial inequality sce-
nario. Here, a Reform party promise of modest amounts of public good will meet with neither
support nor opposition by any informed group. Elections should thus be a toss-up. However, a
37
Reform party promise of more significant amounts of public goods (P≈ 30) begins to garner some
informed support. A promise of quite high levels of tax-financed public goods (P > 100) gar-
ners the greatest amount of informed political support. While there are still taxpayers in the low
inequality economy that will pay more in taxes then they receive in public goods, the returns to
public goods are extraordinarily high for this class of voters as public capital augments the pro-
ductivity of private capital. These groups thus find it in their interest to support reform parties and
policies for relatively high public expenditure levels.
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